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Abstract 
Culturally shaped rule of fair distribution says that the distribution of goods and burdens must be made proportionally. 
Situations in which this rule is waived should, therefore, be regarded as exceptional and justified. Currently, it is in the 
case of division of the seats in the European Parliament among the representatives of Member States. In relation with the 
occurrence of such a situations there arises a need for the assessment of the proposed solutions for the deviations from the 
proportional solutions. This paper proposes measures that can be used for comparison of various proposals of degressively 
proportional divisions in this context. 
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1. Introcuction 
Aristotle's concept of proportional distribution of goods presented in Nicomachean Ethics (Arystoteles, 2002) 
was for many years the model of legislative regulations development, in particular the ones regarding electoral 
systems. On this basis, solutions for selecting representatives of society were created. The principle of 
proportional allocation works well for small discrepancies in the population of electoral districts or the support 
obtained during elections. Otherwise, there appears marginalization of certain groups. In electoral laws there is a 
solutions that is often referred to as an electoral threshold. Designed to avoid excessive fragmentation it sets the 
minimum support that must be obtained by a  political party to enter parliament. This solution is not acceptable 
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on the basis of European standards because the idea of the community is not to deprive its smallest members of 
their representation. For this reason, a solution has been proposed to ensure the correct number of members of 
parliament is appointed from all Member States. 
The Treaty of Lisbon (The Treaty of Lisbon, 2010) formed the principle of degressive proportionality as a 
legal principle of distribution. This means a departure from the generally applicable rules of allocation. The main 
reason for rejecting the proportional distribution are the significant differences in the population of individual 
states, members of the European community. Distributing the seats proportionally to the population of states one 
would choose between a too large number of deputies in general or underrepresentation of the smallest countries. 
To address this issue a construction was created that can also be used in other cases in which, for similar reasons, 
a need to give up the classic proportional solutions arises. 
However, this construction has s framework character which allows many possible solutions (Pukelsheim, 
2007; Ramirez González et al., 2006; Ramirez González et al., 2012; Serafini, 2012). For this reason, additional 
arrangements are needed to particularise the individual, specific solutions. Depending on the scope of the 
degressively proportional rule the additional arrangements may be different and that is why it is important that 
they can be compared in terms of deviation from the proportional allocation. 
 
2. Boundary measure of degressive proportionality 
Based on the analysis of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and related documents (Lamassoure and 
Severin, 2007) one can come across the following definition of degressive proportionality: The sequence 
s1, s2, ..., sn is degressively proportional with respect to p1 d  p2 d ... d pn if and only if:  
s1 d  s2 d ... d sn and 1 2
1 2
n
n
pp p
s s s
d d d . 
The definition of a degressively proportional sequence si with respect to a determined sequence pi is very 
general. There can be many of such si sequences, and therefore practical application of degressively 
proportional distribution in specific situations requires clarification. Such clarification may be obtained in two 
ways. First, by specifying the boundary conditions of the distribution, namely the sum 
1
n
i
i
H s
 
 ¦  and smin= s1 
and smax = sn and secondly, by specifying internal conditions, i.e. the way of transforming the structure the 
sequence pi into si. 
The boundary conditions constitute a very important element of providing additional details to the 
considerations (Łyko, 2012). They include the proper degression of distribution. Indeed, as with these values 
H and smax and smin one can can, for electoral systems, specify the minimum rmin and maximum rmax number of 
voters represented by one Member of European Parliament. Using the proportional divisions one seeks to 
ensure that the difference is as little as possible. Of course, in the case of integer divisions, zero difference is 
practically impossible to implement due to the necessity of rounding to whole numbers, but its minimization 
as a rule remains in force (Misztal, 2012). Therefore, the scale of the degression of the distribution is visible 
in the difference between the values rmin and rmax. In the case of proportional allocation for each i, ri is 
approximately equal to the constant value of VR
H
 where 
1
n
i
i
V p
 
 ¦ , while in the case of degressively 
proportional distribution,  ri  is a monotonic sequence with terms belonging to the interval [rmin, rmax]. 
This issue can also be interpreted from the point of view geometry. The classical principle of proportional 
distribution derives from the proper proportion sections specified in Thales’ theorem. Reaching to the source 
or original works of Aristotle there can be found such intuitive, geometric statements: Mathematicians call 
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this kind of proportion geometrical; for it is in geometrical proportion that it follows that the whole is to the 
whole as either part is to the corresponding part (Arystoteles, 2002). Hence, the intention of understanding 
justice in distribution of wealth is obvious. Aristotle sees it mathematically, according to the Thales’ theorem. 
Determining proportions on a given section explicitly generates proportions on the second one, consequently, 
making a division. In the case of degressively proportional distribution the relevant intervals are not parallel. 
Therefore, this non-parallelism can be used to design a measure of disproportionality of the degressively 
proportional distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Proportional and degressively proportional distribution 
Proportional distribution in case of distribution of seats among the specific countries would be based on the 
fact that the country with the smallest population, *1p  would receive s1 seats, the country with the largest 
population of *np  would receive sn seats. When distributing the seats in the degressively proportional way, the 
number of seats s1 awarded to the country with the  population of p1 and sn of seats to the country with the 
population of pn. Degression of the division is thus created by the difference of  length of intervals 1 np p  
and * *1 np p . As a result, the number of 
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* 1nU s s R   can be considered as a 
measure of degression of the distribution achieved only by identifying these specific boundary conditions. UB 
is of course a number from the interval [–1, 1], and its value equal to zero signifies proportional distribution. 
This measure is a numerical representation of the deviation from proportionality, which is the result of only 
a violation of proportion by the least and most populous state. The interpretation presented here in the 
example of the distribution of seats is of course more general and applies to all distributions differing from the 
proportional one. In the same way one may assess the degression of  distribution, no matter what is distributed 
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and with regards to what the distribution is performed. 
3. Internal and global measure of degressive proportionality 
While it may be assumed that the boundary conditions are arbitrary and give the general shape of the 
degression of the division, determining the internal conditions should be based on precisely specified rules. 
These rules may vary depending on the purpose of constructing the degressively proportional sequence. 
However, given the cultural conditions, especially in cases involving parliamentary representation, one should 
have recourse to the rules derived from the classical principles of proportional representation. The idea is for 
the si sequence structure to represent most faithfully the structure of the pi sequence. Therefore, one can 
assume that the measure of the internal degressive proportionality should be linked to non-parallelism of the 
intervals i is p   and the 1 1i is p  . 
Assuming that 
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a specific indicator ui can be defined as follows 
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From the definition of ui one may state that there could be less than n – 1 of such numbers. This value is 
not specified when si = si+1 and therefore the set of N0 of those i, for which ui  is defined, can be an appropriate 
subset of the set {1, 2, ..., n – 1}. This means that the internal degression of distribution excludes directly 
adjacent pairs such that si = si+1. In such situations, one should take into account the cumulative degression 
resulting from the equality si = si+1 = … = si+k-1. 
As a measure of internal degression of distribution one can propose the number ^ `
0
maxI ii NU u . It 
describes the biggest, in case of distributions of seats allocated per one seat, deviation from proportionality 
achieved from the allocation of  s1 d  s2 d ... d sn. One can consequently declare 
00
1
cardG ii N
U u
N 
 ¦  to be the 
measure of global degression, where card N0 is the cardinality of the set N0. Of course, the closer the numbers 
are to zero the more the similar the specific distribution is to the proportional one. 
Taking into account the conditions of the Lisbon Treaty, namely smin = 6, smax = 96 and H = 751 it can be 
calculated that the previously defined boundary measure of this distribution UB = 0.143. This figure is of 
course the same for all solutions in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. Individual detailed proposals 
may vary with respect to internal and global measures. In the case of the last proposal of distribution of seats 
in the European Parliament in the 2014-2019 term  (Report, 2013) the measures have the value of UI = 0.475 
and UG = 0.214. 
4. Conclusions 
The proposed solution of measuring the degression of the distribution uses as a model the classical 
principle of proportionality. Specific distribution is compared with a proportional in two aspects. The first 
includes only boundary conditions that create a framework for the entire allocation. In this case, one takes into 
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account only the smallest and the largest allocation of the distributed goods. The second one takes into 
account the entire structure of the distribution. It describes how faithfully the si sequence, in the sense of 
proportionality, represents the pi sequence. In the provided example, reference was made to the allocation of 
seats in the European Parliament. However, the proposed solution has wider application. With the defined 
indicators degression of any distribution may be compared. This therefore allows the assessment of specific 
solutions from the point of view of classical fairness of distribution represented in accordance to Aristotle’s  
analysis by proportional distribution.  
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